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A risk-averse price-setting firm which knows the quantity demanded at the 
status quo price but has imperfect information otherwise may choose not to 
change it although an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm would do so, pro- 
vided the variance of the firm's subjective probability distribution over quan- 
tities demanded as a function of price displays a kink at the status quo. This 
is equivalent to risk aversion of order one. When no such endogenous fixpfice 
exists, the size of price adjustment s ill tends to zero as risk aversion tends to 
infinity, and to any arbitrarily small menu cost there exists a degree of risk 
aversion so that the firm will not adjust. 
Keywords: fixed prices, price adjustment, risk aversion, menu cost. 
JEL classification: D21, D81, D83. 
1 Introduction 
The nominal rigidity of prices is still an intriguing economic prob- 
lem. From empirical studies like Carlton's (1986) it is clear that price 
stickiness is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored as part of business 
reality. However, theoretical models so far fail to fully account for the 
degree of rigidity empirically observed.1 The problem is that nominal 
rigidities appear to contradict he rationality of the economic agents 
involved. Accordingly there have been theoretical investigations that 
ascribe rigidities to the presence of not perfectly maximizing behavior 
(near rationality), but also to costs related to the adjustment of prices 
1 As for example Mankiw and Romer (1991, p. 5) put it: "Empirical 
studies of price adjustment by individual firms ... suggest that the extent of 
nominal stickiness at the microeconomic level is large and that price adjust- 
ment policies are quite complex. To date the reasons for those policies have 
defied explanation." 
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(menu costs), to strategic interactions among oligopolists and missing 
coordination among monopolistic competitors (coordination failure), to 
certain characteristics of the production function and of the demand 
function, and to imperfect and asymmetric information. The present 
paper takes up a relatively new reason for nominal price rigidities, 
namely risk aversion by price-setting firms. 
The main idea is simple. When a monopolist 2 contemplates to adjust 
his price, he typically has a better idea of the quantity demanded at the 
current price than of that at any new one. Moreover, uncertainty about 
the variation in profit increases with the size of the price change. This 
does not necessarily matter as long as he is risk neutral but if uncertainty 
is undesirable due to risk aversion it will give rise to an incomplete 
adjustment only. 
Moreover, and this is less immediate, a risk-averse firm may choose 
not to adjust its price at all although an otherwise identical risk-neutral 
firm would do so. When a status quo price has this property we call it 
an endogenous fixprice. As we show, whether or not such prices exist 
depends on the behavior of the variance associated with the random 
quantity demanded at any price. This defines a functional relationship 
between price and variance. Loosely speaking, endogenous fixprices 
exist if, and only if, this relationship displays a kink at the status quo 
price. Such kinks are compatible with weak convergence, traditionally 
assumed in decision theory under uncertainty, of the probability distri- 
butions involved, and thus with smooth expected-demand curves. 
This fact can also be expressed using terminology recently intro- 
duced in the theory of decision making under uncertainty. More pre- 
cisely, Segal and Spivak (1990) have distinguished between risk aver- 
sion of order one and risk aversion of order two. It turns out that the 
case of existence of endogenous fixprices corresponds exactly to risk 
aversion of order one. 
When no endogenous fixprices exist, risk aversion is still crucial 
because the optimal size of price change decreases with increasing risk 
aversion. We show this for the case in which quantity demanded is 
normally distributed and the utility function of profit of the firm dis- 
plays constant absolute risk aversion. Specifically, as the risk-aversion 
parameter goes to infinity, price adjustment tends to zero. 
When price adjustment tends to zero, so does the difference between 
the maximum expected utility and the utility at the status quo. There- 
fore, if there is a small cost of price adjustment, it is less convenient 
2 Although we will speak in the sequel mostly of a monopolist, his is 
mainly for abbreviation of "price-setting firm acting in an imperfectly com- 
petitive market." 
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for a risk-averse firm than for a risk-neutral one to change its price. 
This substantially reinforces the menu-cost argument. More precisely 
we show that, however small the cost is, there exists a threshold egree 
of risk aversion such that a firm with at least this risk aversion sticks 
to its price whereas a less risk-averse (and afortiori a risk-neutral) firm 
adjusts it. 
Although risk aversion of firms is a hypothesis not unfamiliar to 
macroeconomists, 3 there seem to be few works that have investigated its 
consequences in a formal model. These include Dr~ze (1979), Green- 
wald and Stiglitz (1989), and Frank (1990). The paper closest to the 
present is the one by Dr~ze who shows that, if the monopolist uses 
the "truncated minimax" decision criterion (see van Moeseke, 1965, 
for a discussion), which calls for maximizing expected value of profit 
minus a multiple of profit's standard eviation, then uncertainty about 
the price elasticity of a linear demand function and risk aversion have 
an effect comparable to that of a kink in the demand curve at the status 
quo point. Moreover, if the firm maximizes expected utility of profit, 
then no kink appears but a risk-averse monopolist behaves as if he had 
to face a concave demand function. Therefore, if changes in price had 
to take place in multiples of a certain basic unit, then this concavity 
still implies that he behaves as if his demand function had a kink at 
the status quo. 
From the description of our results above it should be clear in 
which way the present paper differs from Dr~ze (1979). In particular we 
do assume throughout the paper that the price-setting firm maximizes 
expected utility of profit. Moreover, no specific functional form of the 
demand function is postulated and the firm is not committed a priori 
to adjust prices in steps of predetermined size. 
Whether firms are risk averse or not is a controversial issue. We do 
not elaborate on this discussion here but maintain that capital-market 
imperfections, the impact of performance-based compensation schemes 
on risk-averse managers, and the possibility of significant bankruptcy 
costs (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993) lend support o the view that 
many firms are risk averse and thus warrant he analysis of the impli- 
cations of risk aversion for price-setting behavior. 4 
3 For example van de Klundert and van Schaik (1990, p. 365) write: "In 
an economywide r cession, firms may increase sales by lowering the price of 
output, but they may be highly uncertain whether this would entail a rise in 
revenue as competitors may lower their prices, too. Under these circumstances 
it could be rational for risk-averse firms to stick to the prevailing price level." 
4 While this is definitely plausible when a firm is owned and run by an 
individual entrepreneur, the assumption of risk aversion might seem less so for 
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In Sect. 2 we set out the model and prove that for a risk-averse 
monopolist his expected utility function is kinked if, and only if, the 
same holds for his corresponding variance function. In Sect. 3 we char- 
acterize formally the circumstances under which endogenous fixprices 
exist and illustrate the significance of the main theorem by means of 
examples. More precisely we show that, somewhat surprisingly, an ap- 
parently smooth specification of the firm's beliefs may induce it to 
change its behavior from flexible to rigid when a single parameter is
allowed to vary in a continuous way. This fact is related to risk aversion 
of order one in Sect. 4. 
In Sect. 5 we study a scenario in which no fixed prices exist and 
establish the convergence of the optimally chosen price by a risk-averse 
monopolist to the status quo price if risk aversion tends to infinity. In 
Sect. 6 we introduce a small cost of price adjustment into the model 
where no endogenous fixprices exist and show that this reestablishes 
the qualitative distinction between risk neutrality and risk aversion in 
that menu cost may imply that a risk-averse firm's behavior is rigid 
where a risk-neutral one's is flexible. Section 7 contains concluding 
remarks, and the more complex proofs are given in an appendix. 
2 The Model 
We consider a monopolist who is uncertain about how quantity de- 
manded is related to the product's price. However, he has experienced, 
and thus has perfect knowledge of, the status quo relationship P0 w-~ Y0 
where we assume P0 > 0. 5 Moreover, the beliefs he has about the 
price-quantity relationship for p 7~ P0 are captured by a subjective 
probability distribution #(PIP0) 6 A(IR+), where A(R+) is the set of 
probability distributions over quantities demanded y ~ R+. Denoting 
with Y(PlPo) the expected value of the random variable having dis- 
tribution/z(plP0) and with ~(y) ~ A(JK+) the degenerate distribution 
which is concentrated in y, we assume 
publicly traded firms. But then a further argument can be added, provided the 
uncertainty is aggregate in nature, because in that case the discussion of the 
legitimacy of risk aversion in Grossman and Hart's (1981) labor-contracting 
model is pertinent here: when the uncertainty is aggregate in nature, the risk 
facing a firm is nondiversifiable by shareholders, and therefore the risk aversion 
of shareholders may carry over to the firm's optimal behavior. 
5 We indicate in the concluding remarks how the analysis can be gener- 
alized to the case where there is uncertainty also at the status quo. 
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A1. #(PoLPo) = 8(Y0); for p 7~ P0, /z(plP0) is given by means of a 
density function f (y ,  PlPo) continuous in y and differentiable in p; 
A2..v(plPo) is decreasing and continuously differentiable in p for all 
p > 0 and P0 > 0; moreover, if p --+ P0, then #(PlPo) --+ /z(P01 
P0) with respect o the topology of weak convergence on A(R+). 6 
A1 states that for p ~ P0 the distribution/z(plp0) can be represented 
by means of a density function whereas for p = P0 it is concentrated 
in Y0. A2 expresses a regularity assumption on the monopolist's beliefs 
which, if not made, would make the analysis quite uninteresting in that 
there could be a kink in the expected-demand curve in which case it 
is of course known that there could be fixed prices. Since in most of 
the following P0 will be fixed we shall suppress it as argument in the 
functions ~(.), f ( . ) ,  etc. whenever this can be done without causing 
confusion. 
Regarding the firm's technology we assume zero fixed cost and 
constant marginal cost c, so its profit is rr = (p - c)y, if (p, y) is an 
actual price-quantity combination. We also write #(p) = (p -c) f , (p)  
for the expected profit in dependence of p. Moreover, we will use the 
notation re0 --- (P0 - c)yo for the status quo profit. 
Now let V (7r) denote the monopolist' s von Neumann-Morgenstern 
6 For/~, v e A(R+), /x ~ v with respect to the topology of weak con- 
vergence iff, for every continuous and bounded function f :  R+ --+ R, f f  dlz 
f f  dr. 
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utility function of profit. We assume that it is real analytic and strictly 
increasing. V gives rise to the expected-utility function U(pJpo) = 
f g ( (p-c)  y) f (y, p) dy. Consider next the function W (p) = V (Yr (p) ). 
By assumption it is differentiable and it coincides with the expected- 
utility function in case the firm is risk neutral. In case it is risk averse 
W(p) > U(pIpo) for all p whereas W(po) = V(rco) = U(po[Po) since 
for p = P0 there is no uncertainty (Fig. 1). 7 From this it is obvious 
that U~-(po) := limp~po U'(plpo) >_ limp_+p+ Ur(p[po) =: U'+(po). 
Moreover, the firm's optimal uncertainty price pU = arg maXp U(plpo) 
will differ from its status quo price Po as long as W and U('lPo) are 
tangent at p = Po and Po is different from p* = argmaxp W(p), the 
price that maximizes expected profit (and expected utility in case of risk 
neutrality). Therefore, to obtain fixed prices, it is decisive to character- 
ize the circumstances under which the function U(-IPo) has a kink at p 
= Po. Whether Ul-(po) and U~+(po) differ from W~(po) will turn out 
to be related to the behavior at p = Po of the function p ~ var ~ (Pl 
Po), where Y(PlPo) indicates the random variable having distribu- 
tion /x(plPo) and var~(plPo) as its variance. Defining var~-(po) = 
limp~po d var ~ (PlP0)/dP and var '+ (P0) = limp__, p0+ d var ~ (PlP0)/dP, 
the following result is obtained the proof of which is given in the ap- 
pendix. 
Proposition 1: Assume A1 and A2. Then U'-(po) > W'(po) iff the 
firm is risk averse and var'-(po) < 0; similarly, U~+(po) < W'(po) iff 
the firm is risk averse and var ~+ (Po) > 0. 
A corollary of Proposition 1 is that the expected-utility function U(.] 
P0) has a kink at p = P0 if, and only if, the firm is risk averse and the 
function var~(.lP0) is kinked at p = P0 (Fig. 2). 
To understand this result intuitively, consider the special case where 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility V and/or the distributions/z(pl 
P0) are such that the expected utility can be expressed as a function 
of #(p)  and varY(p) only, i.e., U(plPo) = T(s var:~(p)), where 
#(p) = (p -  c)~(p). If T is differentiable in its arguments ~ and 
7 We work here with expected rather than with rank-dependent or other 
nonexpected utility because the former is still the most commonly known and 
used approach among economists for dealing with decisions under uncertainty. 
This implies, however, that risk aversion is entirely modeled through decreas- 
ing marginal von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Rank-dependent utility, on 
the other hand, allows to separate probabilistic risk attitudes from marginal 
utility (see, e.g., Wakker, 1994). 
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var#, then it is clear that a kink occurs in U(.lP0) only if it occurs 
in varsT(p) = (p -  c)2varf~(plPo) since #(p)  = (p -  c)f~(p) is by 
assumption differentiable. 
3 Endogenous Fixprices 
We now discuss the relevance of the above result for the existence of 
fixed prices. To this end consider the assumption 
A3. The optimal price under isk neutrality p* exists, is unique, and is 
independent of the status quo price P0. 
Although it is quite easy to conceive of reasonable cases in which p* 
does not exist (e.g., isoelastic expected emand with elasticity smaller, 
in absolute value, than one), it is better not to tackle that problem here. 8
To assume that p* is unique and not depending on P0 will facilitate 
8 For a systematic treatment, see Weinrich (1997). 
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the argument; he latter is for example fulflled whenever expectations 
are unbiased, i.e., Y(Plp0) = y(P) for any p and P0 where y(p) is an 
underlying true (but unknown) demand function. 
Consider now the case that the variance function var~('rp0) is 
kinked at p = P0 and more precisely that var'-(p0) < 0 and vd+(p0)  
> 0 for all P0 in a neighborhood of p*. Then, since W1(p *) = 0, Propo- 
sition 1 not only implies that Ul-(p *) > 0 > U'+(p *) but also that 
there exists a neighborhood N of p* such that U'-(po) > 0 > U'+(po) 
for all Po 6 N, provided the following holds: 
A4. U'-(po) --+ U'-(p*) ~ ~ and Ut+(po) --~ U'+(p *) c ~ when 
Po --+ P*. 
But then, whenever P0 E N, it is optimal for the risk-averse firm not to 
change it and thus P0, if different from p*, is an endogenous fixprice 
in the following sense: 
Definition 1: A status quo price P0 r P* is an endogenous fixprice if 
it is suboptimal in case of risk neutrality but optimal in case of risk 
aversion. 
The following theorem summarizes our analysis. 
Theorem 1: Assume A1, A2, and A3. If Po is an endogenous fixprice, 
then the variance function var ~(. FPo) is kinked at p = P0- Conversely, 
if var'-(po) < 0 and var'+(p0) > 0 for all P0 in a neighborhood of p* 
and if in addition A4 holds, then there exist endogenous fixprices. 
Loosely speaking, there exist endogenous fixprices if, and only if, 
the variance function of Y('IP0) is kinked at p = P0 for all Po in a 
neighborhood of p*. 
We illustrate the significance of this result in the following two 
examples. 
Example 1: Assume that there is a true, but unknown, demand func- 
tion of the form y(p) = a - p, a > 0. Thus any observation / sta- 
tus quo (P0, Y0) meets y0 + po = a. Assume moreover that the firm 
believes that y(polpo) = Yo with probability one and the change in 
y for p ~ P0, z = y - Yo, is normally distributed with parameters 
v(p) and a(p), where p = p - P0- More precisely, setting g(z; v, a) 
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= [0"~/~-] le-(z-~)2/2~ Y(PlPo) has density f (Yo+Z,  Po+P)  = g(z; 
v(p) ,  or(p)). Then Y(Po+ P) = yo+v(p)  and var ~(po+ p[po) = ~r2(p). 
Now specify the functions v and cr to be v(p)  = -p  and ~r(p) = 
/3 ] p [z, with 13 and g given positive parameters. Then ~ (Po + P) = Yo - P 
= a - p, p* = (a + c)/2 is unique and independent of Po, var ~ (Po + P [ 
Po) = fi2lpl2z, and #(P[Po) --+ g(Yo) weakly for p --+ Po. The abso- 
lute value of the derivative of var ;? (Po+P [ Po) is 2132 g [p 12z-1 and tends 
to zero for p -+ Po iff g > 1/2. For y < 1/2 Proposition 1 therefore 
implies that the expected-utility function is kinked at the status quo. 
To be still more specific, assume V(zr) ----- -e  -~r. Then, using the 
well-known result in distribution theory (see, e.g., Meyer, 1970) that 
f etX g(x; v, or) dx = e tv+t2~r2/2 , (1) 
the monopolist's expected-utility function becomes 
U (po + PIPo) = -e-(P~176 ]e-(P~ -P , /3 IP [  • dz 
= - -e  -r(plp~ (2) 
with 
r(plpo) = (Po + P - c)(yo - p) - l (po + p - c)2 fl21p[2Z 
= #(Po + PlPo) - 1 var ~(po + P[Po) - 
Then U'(p lpo)  = dU(po + p lpo) /dp  = e-r(PlP~ Moreover, 
limp~o r(plPo) = 7ro = (po - c)y(po) ,  whereas 
r ' (p lpo = Yo - Po + c -  2p 
and thus 
- fi2(po + p - c)[p[2• + sgn(p))/(po + p - c)] 
lim r ' (plPo) = yo - Po + c + fl2y(po - c) 2 l im ( _p)2y -1  . 
p--+O p--+O- 
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This yields 
U'-(po) 
{ Y(P0) - P0 + c if V > 1/2, 
= e -(p~176 • Y(Po) - Po + c + flZy(p 0 - c) 2 if V = 1/2, 
+cx~ if y < 1/2. 
From this it is clear that, for any given V, U ' - (po)  ~ U ' - (p* )  in 
when P0 --~ P*- Analogously follows U'+(po) --+ U'+(p *) when P0 
--+ p*; thus A4 is fulfilled. Therefore Theorem 1 implies the existence 
of endogenous fixprices when y < 1/2. Note also that Y(P0) - P0 + c 
>0 ,,' ',, a -2p0+c>0 < '; Po <(a+c) /2=p* .  
In the above example the monopolist does not exclude that an in- 
crease (decrease) in his price results in an increase (decrease) of the 
quantity demanded. 9 Although this is an event not incompatible with 
consumer theory, it may be considered unlikely. This can be easily 
taken care of by, for example, assuming the parameter fl small or pos- 
tulating lognormal densities; the latter is done in the next example. 
Example 2: We consider a similar set-up as in Example 1 but assume 
now that h(z; v, ~r) = [z~r q /~] - le  -(l~ and Y(PlPo) has den- 
sity 
Then 
and 
h(Izl; v(p) ,~(p) )  i fpz  < O, 
f (Yo + z, Po + P) = 0 i fpz>O.  
I Yo -- sgn(p)e v(p)+'rz(p)/2 if p ~ 0, 
Y(p0 + P) ! Yo if p = 0, 
var~(po + P]Po) = e2V(p){e 2crz(p) -- e ~rz(p)} if p 5~ 0 ,  
9 Actually, even a negative quantity is not excluded. This could be easily 
overcome, however, by working with truncated normal distributions, without 
changing anything substantial but adding to technical complexity. 
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whereas var~(p0lP0) = 0. v(.) and o-(-) are assumed to be 
1 j v(p) =log lP l  ~log(IPl 2• + 1), ~(p) : log(IPl2• -2+ 1) 
with ?/ > 0. Inserting this in the above expressions for ~ and var ~ one 
finds Y(Po + P) = yo - P, var~(po + P]Po) = Ipl 2y- Then /z(plPo) 
--> 3(Yo) weakly for p --+ Po and the derivative of var~(po +PIPo) 
again tends to zero for p --+ Po iff g > 1/2. Thus the expected-utility 
function is kinked at the status quo iff ?/ < 1/2. 
Note that in the present examples an apparently smooth specification 
of the firm' s beliefs may result in a nonsmooth behavior of the firm due 
to a continuous variation of a single parameter. This does not appear 
to be exactly what intuition would have suggested, and it indicates that 
the origins of price rigidities may be quite intricate. 
4 Endogenous Fixprices and Risk Aversion of Order One 
We now relate the above results to the concept of risk aversion of 
order one which has been introduced by Segal and Spivak (1990) to 
explain full insurance of a risk-averse agent in presence of positive 
marginal loading. Expected-utility heory with the traditional notion of 
risk aversion has not been able to achieve this but, on the contrary, as 
Borch (1974, pp. 27f) has asserted, its prediction of partial insurance 
only is "against all observation." 
To bridge the present model to Segal and Spivak's framework we 
define the certainty equivalent zrc (p) of the random variable :2 (P0 + P l 
P0) by V(:rC(p)) = U(po + PIP0) and its risk premium by R(p) = 
# (p) - Jr c (p) where, by slight abuse of notation, # (p) = 7? (P0 + pip0). 
Then R(0) = 0, R(p) > 0 for all p when V is concave, and we can 
adapt Segal and Spivak's definition to the present context as follows. 
Definition 2: A firm is risk averse of order one at Po if limp_,o+ R'(p) > 
0 and limp~o- R'(p) < 0. It is risk averse of order two if limp~o R'(p) 
= 0 but limp~o+ R"(p) > 0 and limp-,o- R"(p) > O. 
Since V is by assumption differentiable, U(plpo) has a kink at p = P0 
iff zrC(p) has one at p = O. But a kink in U(plPo) is equivalent to a 
kink in vat Y(PIP0) whereas a kink in zcC(p) is equivalent to a kink in 
R(p). Thus Theorem 1 implies the following 
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Corollary 1: Assume A1 to A4. If the monopolist is risk averse of 
order one at P0 for all P0 in a neighborhood of p*, then there exist 
endogenous fixprices. Conversely, if P0 is an endogenous fixprice, then 
the monopolist is risk averse of order one at P0- 
Example 1 (continued): From V(n-) = -e  -~r and the definition of 
7rC(p) it follows that U(po+plPo)  = -e  -~c(p), so from Eq. (2) ~c = 
and R(p) = 1 ~(Po + P - c) 2 vary(po +P[Po)-  From this it is evident 
that for Po > c the monopolist is risk averse of order one iff vary(p[ 
Po) is kinked at p : Po. This is the case when y ~ [0, 1/2]. Instead 
when y c (1/2, 1] he is risk averse of order two. 1~ 
In the present context, risk aversion of order one is compatible 
with V being differentiable. This is at variance with what Segal and 
Spivak (1990, pp. 117f) find. The reason is that the random variables 
they consider are of the form 2(t) = x + tg, with g being independent 
of t. This is equivalent to saying that there hold stochastic onstant 
returns to scale (i.e., constant distributions over the rate of return). 
Therefore var2(t) = t 2 varY, which can never be kinked (so to obtain 
risk aversion of order one V needs to be kinked or expected utility 
to be abandoned). In the present model, on the other hand, #(p)  = 
7r0 + g (p) and, although g(0) = 0 and the distribution of g(p) is weakly 
continuous in p at p = 0, stochastic returns to scale typically are not 
constant. In fact, in the present case of a monopolist there is no reason 
why they should be. 
5 Price Inertia When No Endogenous Fixprices Exist 
As seen in the previous ections, risk aversion can give rise to endoge- 
nous fixprices in the sense that a risk-averse monopolist may stick to a 
price which is not optimal under risk neutrality. The crucial condition 
for this to happen is that the variance function of the perceived random 
variable quantity demanded has a kink at the status quo price. But even 
if this is not the case, risk aversion may make an important difference: 
although there may be no fixed prices, the adjustment of prices under 
risk aversion tends to be more sluggish than under risk neutrality, or in 
other words, risk aversion implies price inertia. To see this, we shall be 
10 Note also that for y = 1/2 maximizing T(p) [and thus U(plPo)] is 
comparable to applying van Moeseke's (1965) truncated minimax decision 
criterion as done in Drbze (1979, eq. (2.7)). 
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more specific now in our assumptions regarding the firm's subjective 
probability distributions and utility function. 
Let as before (p0, y0) denote the status quo where we suppose P0 
> c so that the firm is not making losses. Using the specifications 
already introduced in Example 1, we now assume 
B1. For p 7~ Po, Y(PlPo) is normally distributed with density f (yo+z ,  
Po + P) = g(z; -p ,  Ipl) = [IPl'v/~] -le-(z+p)2/21pl2, where z -= 
Y - Yo and p = p - Po;/x(PolPo) = 6(yo). 
From this it is immediate that ~(p) = Y0 + P0 - P- Moreover, from 
Example 1, no endogenous fixprices exist. 
Regarding the monopolist's utility function for profit we assume: 
B2. The monopolist's utility function is of type CARA, that is V= (re) = 
-e  -an, when ot > 0, whereas V0(n-) = zr. 
Accordingly, he has constant absolute risk aversion ot and for ot ~ 0 
he becomes risk neutral. 
B 1 and B2 give rise, when ~ > 0, to the expected-utility function 
EV~rr = - f e-~(P~176 g(z; -p ,  ]Pl) dz =: U (p, ~) while EVoTr 
= #(p) .  Applying again formula (1) one finds for a > 0, U(p, ~) 
= -e  -~r(p'a), with 
r (p ,  or) = (Po + P - c)(yo - p) - (~/2)(p0 + p - c)21p] 2
= ~(p)  - (or/2) varY(p) . 
(3) 
Since U(.) is strictly increasing in r, the optimal deviation from the 
status quo price p*(ot) = argmaxp U(p, ~) is determined by the con- 
dition 0r(p*, et)/Op = 0. Note that this can be extended to the case 
ot = 0 because EVozr = r(p ,  0). Thus r (p ,  or) can effectively be taken 
as the firm's objective function; it is well defined and continuous in o~ 
for all a >_ 0. 
Proposition 2: Assume B1, B2, and P0 ~ P*. Then (a) the absolute 
value of the optimal deviation from the status quo price is a decreasing 
function of the firm's absolute risk aversion, i.e., dip*(o0 [/do~ < 0, and 
(b) l im~ p*(c~) = 0. 
Proof" a. We prove the result for the case p* > Po only; the one for p* 
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< Po is analogous. If  p* > Po, then 0U(0, u)/Op = W:(po) > 0 and 
therefore p*(a) > 0. Thus the absolute value in (3) can be neglected 
and condition Or(p*, a)/Op = 0 becomes 
Y0 + c - Po - 2p* - otp*(po + p* - c)(po + 2p* - c) = 0 .  (4) 
This allows to calculate 
dp*(a)/dot = -{P*(Po § P* - c)(po + 2p* - c)} x 
x {2 + ol(po + p* - c)(po + 2p* - c) 
+ otp*[(po + 2p* - c) + 2(po + p* - c)]] -1 
which is negative since Po - c > 0 and p* > 0. 
b. We show the case p* > po only. Since OU(O, oL)/Op = W'(po) 
> 0, p*(oe) > 0. We show first: 
For any p > 0 there exists u > 0 such that U(p, or) < U(0, o~) . (5) 
Indeed, U(p, oe) < U(0, oe) is equivalent o r (p ,  or) < r(0, a)  which 
means (po + P - c)(yo - p) - (oe/2)(po + p - c)2p2/2 < 7r0. For this 
inequality it is immediate that the expression on the left-hand side can 
be made smaller than the one on the fight-hand side by choosing oe big 
enough. This proves (5). 
By (5) p*(ot) cannot be bounded away from 0 as oe -+ oc. Since 
d[p*(o~)[/d~ < 0, this proves the claim. [] 
6 Risk Aversion and Menu Cost 
The fact that the optimal deviation from the status quo price tends 
to zero when risk aversion goes to infinity implies that the maximum 
expected utility under risk aversion tends to the status quo utility, too. 
This suggests that small menu costs have a bigger impact on the firm's 
behavior when it is risk averse than when it is risk neutral. 
To make this idea more precise assume now that profit is Jr = 
(p - c)y - )~, where ), > 0 is a price-adjustment cost parameter, when 
p 7 ~ po, and zr = (po -c )y0  = Zro otherwise. Then it is easy to 
see that expected utility is, when p 7~ 0 and ot > 0, U(p, ~, k) = 
-e  -~[~(p,a)-zl, where r is as in (3). When p 7~ 0 and ot = 0 we set 
U(p, 0, 3.) = ~(p)  - ) , .  In any case this is to be compared with V~ (zVo), 
the status quo utility. The firm will not adjust its price iff U(p*(oO, o~, 
z) _< v~or0). 
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Since, for P0 ~ P*, V~(zro) < U(p*(a),  a, 0) < 0 and U(p*(~), 
or, )0 = U(p*(a) ,  a, 0)e ~x for a > 0 and )~ _> 0, it follows that there 
exists, for any ot > 0, )~(et) such that U(p*(ot), et, X(ot)) = V~(rro). 
Moreover, we can set X(0) = (Po + p*(0) - c)(yo - p*(0)) - 7r0. Then 
X(a) > 0 for all a and the firm adjusts its price iff U(p*(ot), e~, O)e ~x 
> U(p*(oO, or, 0)e ~k(~), if o~ > 0, and (P0 + p*(0) - c)(yo - p*(0)) 
> 7c0 + X, if el = 0. In any case this is equivalent to 7. < )~(ot). This 
proves the first part of the following result. 
Proposition 3: Assume B1, B2, and P0 5 ~ P*- Then, for any degree 
of risk aversion ot > 0 there exists ~(a) > 0 such that the monopolist 
adjusts his price iff his adjustment cost X is smaller than X(ot). Con- 
versely, for any adjustment cost )~ > 0 there exists a finite 6()0 > 0 
such that he adjusts his price iff his degree of risk aversion ot is smaller 
than f (X). 
Proof" See appendix. 
The significance of Proposition 3 should be straightforward. The menu- 
cost argument is so far the most frequently given justification for as- 
suming nominal price stickiness, in particular in New Keynesian Eco- 
nomics. However, a given menu cost may be too small to prevent a 
firm from adjusting. In that case, admitting uncertainty, there exists 
a degree of risk aversion so that the monopolist sticks to his current 
price. In other words, with uncertainty and risk aversion much smaller 
menu cost are needed to obtain nominal rigidity. Indeed, according to 
the above result any positive adjustment cost does the job, provided 
risk aversion is sufficiently big. 
To get an idea of the size of the effect of risk aversion on mini- 
mum menu cost needed, observe that, by definition of ~(ot), e ~k(~) = 
V~ (7r0)/U (p* (a), or, 0) = -e  -~~ / - e -~  (p* (~)'~) which is, taking log- 
arithms, dividing by or, and using (3), equivalent to 
~(a) = -7r0 + r(p*(a) ,  a) 
= # (p* (a)) - (or/2) var 7~ (p* (a)) - 7r0 . 
(6) 
Now set 
A(p, or) = #(p)  - (or/2) var#(p)  - 7r0 . (7) 
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Then k(o~) = A(p*(ot), or). This yields 
OA * ot d * OA , k'(~) = -~(p () ,  o0-~j(~) + -5-g(p (~), o0. 
But from (3) and (7) p*(o0 = argmaxp r(p, or) = argmaxp A(p,  ~) 
and so (OA/Op)(p*(ot), or) = O. This implies 
k'(oe) = - 1 var ~ (p* (oe)) . (8) 
Whenever P0 7 ~ P*, p*(ot) r 0 for all oe, and thus from (8) k'(oe) < 0 
for all a. Since this holds in particular for oe = 0, it means that there 
is always a first-order effect of abandoning risk neutrality in favor of 
risk aversion on the minimum menu cost required for fixed prices. 
Example 3: Assume c = 1, P0 = 2, and Y0 = 3. Then re0 = 3 and (3) 
yields 
~(p)  = (1 + p)(3 - p) ~ 72'(p) = 2(1 - p) = 0 ~ p*(0) = 1 . 
Thus the optimal price in case of risk neutrality is p* = 3 and maximum 
profit is ~(1) = 4. From this and (6) follows )~(0) = 1. Moreover, from 
(3) and varY(p) = (1 + p)2[p[2 we can derive the optimality condition 
for p*(a), (Or/Op)(p, a) = 2(1 - p) - oep(1 + p)(1 + 2p) = 0. From 
this and (6) one calculates for example p*(1) ~ 0.429, )~(1) ~ 0.486, 
p*(2) ,-~ 0.317, ~.(2) ,~ 0.359, p*(10) ~ 0.125, and ~.(10) ~ 0.135. 
The graph of the function ~.(.) is shown in Fig. 3. From this it is evident 
that even small degrees of risk aversion substantially reduce minimum 
menu cost needed. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have shown that risk aversion of firms may be a crucial 
element in explaining price rigidity. We have identified circumstances 
under which a risk-averse monopolist sticks to his current price al- 
though an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm would change it. Such 
prices, which we have called endogenous fixprices, exist if the mo- 
nopolist's perceived variance of quantity demanded isplays a kink at 
any status quo price sufficiently close to the optimal price under risk 
neutrality. Equivalently, it means that he is risk averse of order one. 
The examples given suggest that this may occur quite easily. Moreover, 
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since kinks in the variance function are compatible with weak conver- 
gence of the probability distributions involved, the expected-demand 
function may be perfectly smooth. 
This result can also be seen as an extension of Sweezy's (1939) 
on the existence of fixed prices in a kinky demand-curve model: under 
uncertainty with risk aversion, to obtain fixed prices there is no need 
for a kink in the demand curve itself but only in the variance function 
arising from the firm's subjective-probability distributions. 
In the second part of the paper we have adopted a scenario which 
excludes the existence of endogenous fixprices so as to show that even 
in that case risk aversion makes a difference relative to risk neutrality. 
In fact, under our assumptions, risk aversion not only implies that the 
size of price adjustment is smaller than under risk neutrality but in the 
limit, as risk aversion tends to infinity, price adjustment tends to zero. 
The introduction of menu cost in this context plays a role similar to 
that of the kink in the variance function: firms risk averse enough stick 
to their status quo price whereas risk-neutral firms abandon it. This may 
at first glance appear surprising because it conflicts with the intuition 
from the well-known local risk-neutrality theorem (Samuelson, 1961; 
Arrow, 1965) according to which a risk-averse decision maker behaves 
locally, i.e., for small amounts at risk, as if he were risk neutral. In the 
present context his would require that a risk-averse monopolist adjust 
his price whenever a risk-neutral one does, albeit by a smaller amount. 
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The reason for the invalidity of that result in the present model is of 
course the presence of menu cost or of a kink in the variance function. 
Both factors are in contrast to stochastic constant returns to scale, which 
is one of the hypotheses on which the local risk-neutrality theorem 
builds. In the present model of a monopolist there are no reasons for 
stochastic onstant rates of return to hold. 
Regarding the assumption that there be no uncertainty at the status 
quo, this is no substantial limitation of generality. In fact, it would be 
easy to generalize the model to the case where there is uncertainty also 
at the status quo: the only change would be to have the variance at the 
status quo positive instead of zero. As long as it takes on a minimum 
there, to obtain endogenous fixprices it would still be necessary and 
sufficient hat the variance function be kinked at the status quo. 
Apart from aiming to contribute to the explanation of price sticki- 
ness per se, this paper's results may be linked to research going on in 
other areas, like Keynesian-type macroeconomics, and, in particular, to 
New Keynesian Economics. There, the assumption of monopolistically 
competitive industries is combined with price rigidities to produce real 
effects of nominal money shocks. The rigidities are mostly rational- 
ized through the assumption of menu cost. The present results suggest 
that risk aversion and kinked variance functions - or, equivalently, risk 
aversion of order one - can play a similar role. More importantly, ac- 
cording to our result in Sect. 6, the relevance of the menu-cost argument 
is revalorized through the presence of risk aversion because menu cost 
too small to matter to risk-neutral firms may well have an impact on 
risk-averse ones. As we have illustrated in a numerical example, the 
difference may be substantial. 
Moreover, in order that nominal money shocks have a real effect 
it is sufficient hat a nonnegligible part of the industry's firms keep 
their prices unchanged. But this may in fact happen as different firms 
may have different attitudes towards risk, even if they share the same 
technology, because they are directed by managers with possibly dif- 
ferent degrees of risk aversion. The above result then establishes that 
there is, for any arbitrarily small menu cost, a threshold egree of risk 
aversion which separates the flexprice firms from their fixprice com- 
panions. Thus for nominal money shocks to be effective it is sufficient 
that some firms' degrees of risk aversion reach the threshold level. 
A further aspect of this result is that, although it has been obtained 
under the assumption of utility functions that display constant absolute 
risk aversion, it is likely that in reality the degree of risk aversion is 
influenced by the firm's current and expected profits and thus by the 
general business climate: with decreasing absolute risk aversion en- 
trepreneurs tend to be more risk averse in recessions than in booms. 
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Thus effective demand management should work better in recessions 
and particularly well in depressions - a thesis already advanced by 
Keynes himself. The formalization of this conjecture could be the sub- 
ject of further research. 
The changes in economic onditions that induce a finn to adjust its 
price are not an explicit part of the present model. Although we are 
all the same convinced that its results are significant enough to support 
the view that risk aversion contributes to price stickiness, we also think 
that further work should be directed to reformulate the setting so as to 
explicitly comprise factors like inflation and other prices. In particular 
it should then be interesting to show that, in presence of menu costs, 
risk aversion leads to less frequent price adjustment than risk neutral- 
ity also in an explicitly dynamic model, as strongly suggested by the 
present results. 
Appendix 
ProofofProposition 1 
Since the variance of Y(PlPo) is var~(plpo) = fy2f (y ,  p)dy - 
( fy f (y ,  p)dy) 2, its derivative, for p r Po, is 
d var y(PlP~ - f [y2 - 2y(P)Y]~p (y' p) dy 
Taking limits as p --+ Po, this yields 
f var'-(po) = (y2 _ 2y0y) (Y, P0) dy , 
where (Of-/Op)(y, Po) = limp-+po (Of/OP)(Y, P). Observing that 
f f (y ,  p)dy = 1 for all p implies yg f(of- /Op)(y,  P0)dy = 0 one 
obtains var~-(p0) = f (y2 _ 2yoy + yg)(of-/Op)(y, Po) dy which can 
be written 
vd- (p0)  = f(y - yo)2 ~ po) dy . (9) 
Since #(plpo) ---> 6(y0) weakly and f is continuous in y, f (y,  p) ---> 0 
for p --> P0 whenever y r Yo. Therefore, and since f (y,  p) > 0 for 
all y and p, (Of-/Op)(y, Po) <_ 0 for all y 7~ yo. 
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Next consider the derivative of the expected-utility function for 
p~ po, 
U'(p,po) = f v'((p-c)y)yf(y, p)dy+ f V((p'c)y)~p(y, p)dy . 
Since P~(PlPo) --+ 3(Yo) weakly for p ~ Po, the first integral tends to 
V' (Tro)Yo. Therefore 
f 0f- U'-(po) = V'(rro)Yo + V((po - c)y)--~-p (y, Po) dy . 
The function W(p)  = V(#(p) )  gives rise to 
g '  (po) = V' (rro)Yo + V' (rro)(Po - c)f/ (po) . 
This entails 
u'-(po) - W' (po) 
= f v((po - c )y ) -  V'(rCo)(Po -c )y l~p(y ,  p0) dy 
= f 
o~ 
+ Z V(n)(:rrO) [(Po - c)y - fro] n 1 a f -  
n[ ]~p-p (y, po)dy , 
n=2 
which yields 
U'- (po) - g1(po) 
f[Z = v(n)(rro) [(P0 - c)y - Jr0] n (10) n! (Y, Po) dy n=2 
since f f (y ,  p) dy = 1 for all p implies 
- v,(.o).o] f oz- (y ,  P0) dy = 0 . 
Comparing (9) and (10) one sees that, for a risk-averse firm, the integral 
in (9) is nil i f fthe one in (10) is nil. This proves the claim for UP-(po). 
The one for U~+(po) follows symmetrically. [] 
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Proof  of  Proposition 3 
We only need to prove the second part of the assertion. We show first 
that rangek(-) = ]0, k(0)]. Since k is continuous and from (8) de- 
creasing in ol, it is sufficient o establish that l im~oo k(ot) = 0. For 
convenience we reproduce (6) as 
k(u) = -z~0 + r(p*(o0, o0 
= :fi(p*(ot)) - (u/2) var~(p*(~)) - zr 0 . 
(11) 
By (3) and Proposition 2, 
c) 2 (p0 
lira r(p*(ot), o0 = no l im r  2 . 
To determine the latter limit, use (4) to derive 
otp * (ot) = (Yo + c - Po - 2p * (ot) ) / (po + p * (oO - c)(po + 2p* (or) - c) , 
which implies lima~oo lp*(oO = (Yo + c - Po)/(Po - C) 2 =: k E 
N. Accordingly, l im~ooalp*(o012 = l i l I l~oo [P*(O0l" [k[ = 0 by 
Proposition 2, and hence l i l I~oo  r(p*(a), a) = z~0. But this yields 
lima~oQ k(a) = 0. Therefore, for any k > 0 smaller than ;.(0) there 
exists &(k) > 0 such that 
U(p*(~(~.)), 6t(k), k) = V~(k)(zr0) . (12) 
Next consider the derivative of U(p*(a), o~, k) - V~(zc0) =: G(o0 
with respect o c~ > 0. We will show that it is negative at ~ = 6~(k) 
which will imply the claim. 
Since V~(z~o) = -e  -~~ G'(o0 is 
OU OU 
-7(p*(~), o~, k)p*'(o0 + =-(p*(~), o~, k) + v~(~0)~r0. 
op Ool  
Recalling that (OU/Op)(p*(oO, or, k) = 0, this becomes 
0Z" , 
U(p*(oO,~,k ) [ - r (p* (oO,eO + k-el~-~(p (~), ~)] + V~(~o)~o 9
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Using (12), this yields 
G'(~00) = U(p*(~(X)), ~(X), X)[-r(p*(Se(X)), ~(X)) + x 
0r ] 
- o t - - (p* (~00) ,  ~(x ) )  + ~0 , 
0ol 
which by (11) becomes 
0r . ~'(a(x)) = v(p*(a(x)), a(x), x ) [ -~(p  (s(x)), a(x))] 
= uo*(aO0), ~()0, )0 var~(p*(~(x))), 
where we have used (3). Since U(.) is negative, this proves the claim. 
[] 
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